Beds with Sheets but No Covers: The Right to Privacy and the Military\u27s Regulation of Adultery by Winner, James M.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-1998
Beds with Sheets but No Covers: The Right to
Privacy and the Military's Regulation of Adultery
James M. Winner
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
James M. Winner, Beds with Sheets but No Covers: The Right to Privacy and the Military's Regulation of Adultery, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1073 (1998).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol31/iss3/25
BEDS WITH SHEETS BUT NO COVERS: THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MILITARY'S
REGULATION OF ADULTERY
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the first skills the military teaches its new recruits is how
to make the "military" bed: sheets tightly pulled over the mattress,
corners crisply folded and ironed, and the covers pulled down and
neatly folded at the foot of the bed. Hence, the sheets are left ex-
posed for careful inspection; drill sergeants search for any stain,
wrinkle, or improper fold. Interestingly, the "military" bed is not just
a training tool; it is symbolic of the bed the new trainees will sleep in
for the remainder of their military careers. For in the name of dis-
cipline and, ultimately, national security, the military requires its
members to set aside their normal covers of autonomy and privacy to
expose their personal lives, including their sexual relationships, for
military inspection.
Through its criminal proscription of adultery, the military figu-
ratively patrols all service members' bedrooms and closely inspects
their choices of sexual partners. Soldiers face criminal prosecution
for having sex with someone other than their spouse or with the
spouse of another. Importantly, the military believes the active en-
forcement of its adultery law is necessary to maintain a disciplined
and effective military force.2 Nevertheless, the regulation's intrusion
into military members' intimate lives seemingly infringes upon prin-
ciples of personal liberty and privacy protected as fundamental rights
under the Constitution.
This Comment establishes the constitutional validity of the mili-
1. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, pt. IV, 62
(1995) [hereinafter MCM].
2. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JusTICE, art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934
(West 1994) [hereinafter UCMJ]; see also United States v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146,
149 (C.M.A. 1986) (stating "adultery remains a viable offense against military
law").
3. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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tary's adultery law. Part II discusses the recent adultery case of Air
Force Lieutenant Kelly Flinn and how this young officer propelled
the issue of the military's proscription of adultery into the public eye.
Part III then analyzes the development of the Supreme Court's pri-
vacy precedent under the doctrine of substantive due process and
concludes that modem privacy protections include a fundamental
right to commit adultery. Finally, Part IV establishes that this pri-
vacy right applies with equal force within the military but concludes
that the military's adultery law is, nonetheless, constitutional because
the regulation of adultery pursues a compelling government interest
of maintaining an effective military and is narrowly drawn so as to ef-
fectuate this compelling need.
II. TARGETING ADULTERY: THE CASE OF LIEUTENANT
KELLY FLINN
Lieutenant Kelly Flinn was a top Air Force Academy graduate
and America's first and only female B-52 bomber pilot.4 She was the
Air Force's star public attraction, appearing in countless recruiting
films and media events.5 However, Lieutenant Kelly Flinn attracted
the most public attention when her private sexual relationship with a
married man landed her in a military courtroom.6
Adultery-having sex with someone other than your spouse or
having sex with the spouse of another-is a crime in the military!
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a set of federal stat-
utes applicable to all military personnel, provides for the criminal
punishment of conduct that threatens "good order and discipline" or
"discredit[s]" the professional image of the armed forces.8 The mili-
tary includes adultery as such an offense.9 Moreover, military mem-
bers convicted of adultery face a maximum punishment of a one-year
prison term and a dishonorable discharge from the service.10
4. See Gregory L. Vistica & Evan Thomas, Sex and Lies, NEWSWEEK, June
2, 1997, at 26.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See MCM, supra note 1, pt. IV, 91 62.
8. UCMJ, supra note 2, art. 134.
9. See MCM, supra note 1, pt. IV, 62.
10. See id. The military utilizes different terminology for punitive discharges
from the service, depending on the rank of the convicted military member. See
MCM, supra note 1, R.C.M. 1003(b)(9); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY PAMPHLET 27-9,
LEGAL SERVICES: MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, at 97-99 (30 Sept. 1996).
For instance, enlisted members and non-commissioned officers convicted of
adultery by a general court-martial can receive a dishonorable discharge, while
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Lieutenant Kelly Flinn became a criminal defendant because she
fell in love with a married man. The man was Marc Zigo, the civilian
husband of an enlisted woman assigned to the same military base as
Flinn." When the two began their affair, Zigo assured Flinn that his
marriage was breaking up, but Flinn knew Zigo was still legally mar-
ried and living with his wife." Zigo's wife, Airman Gayla Zigo, soon
discovered her husband's affair and complained to her military su-
pervisor, who later informally advised Flinn to stop interfering with
the airman's marriage and warned the star pilot that she was risking
her career. 13 Nevertheless, Flinn ignored this admonition and con-
tinued to see Zigo.14 Eventually, a formal complaint was filed against
Flinn, and the Air Force initiated an investigation that probed into
Flinn's private sexual activities. 5 Fearing the loss of her career, Flinn
denied having a sexual relationship with Marc Zigo, but, unknown to
Flinn, her lover had given the military police detailed accounts of
their sexual activities, including her sexual preferences, how often
they had sex, and their methods of birth control. 6 Subsequently,
Flinn's commander ordered her to have no further personal contact
with Marc Zigo.'7 Despite this order, Flinn still hoped to salvage her
relationship with Zigo and allowed him to remain living at her off-
base house, where he had moved after his wife kicked him out of
commissioned officers and commissioned officer candidates (cadets and mid-
shipmen) convicted of the same offense can receive a punitive dismissal, the
functional equivalent of a dishonorable discharge. See id. Both types of dis-
charge characterize the military member's dismissal from the service as "under
conditions of dishonor after conviction of serious offenses of a civil or military
nature warranting such severe punishment." Id. at 98-99.
11. See Nancy Gibbs, Wings of Desire: The Air Force's Star Female Pilot
Finds Herself Enmeshed in a Tale Full of Passion and Lies, TIME, June 2, 1997, at
28,31.
12- See Vistica & Thomas, supra note 4, at 28.
13. See Gibbs, supra note 11, at 32.
14. See id.
15. See id. In addition to the affair, the investigation revealed that, during a
party thrown at her house, Flinn had sex on the front lawn of her private resi-
dence with an enlisted man. See id. at 31. The Air Force prohibits private rela-
tionships between all officers and enlisted personnel under the UCMJ. See
MCM, supra note 1, pt. IV, 83. Accordingly, this encounter as well as a subse-
quent instance of sex with the same enlisted man gave rise to additional charges
of fraternization against Flinn. See Colonel Jack L. Rives, It Works For Us: A
Guide to the Military's Rules on Fraternization and Adultery, THE REPORTER,
Dec. 1997, at 3, 6 (Colonel Rives is the Commandant of the Air Force Judge Ad-
vocate General School (AFJAGS) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama).
16. See Vistica & Thomas, supra note 4, at 29.
17. See Gibbs, supra note 11, at 32.
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their home.18 Based upon Flinn's adulterous affair and her related
misconduct during the investigation, the Air Force initiated court-
martial proceedings against their once heralded star.19
Lieutenant Flinn, however, did not allow her court-martial to
proceed quietly. She hired a highly skilled team of civilian attorneys'
and a high-profile public relations firm to fight for her defense.21
Flinn wanted the American public to know that the Air Force had in-
truded into her private and personal life to enforce a seemingly ar-
chaic adultery law.' Kelly Flinn's plight appeared in countless major
newspapers, magazines, and television programs; they all told the
story of an accomplished officer who faced the end of her career as a
pilot, a federal conviction, and a possible prison term all because the
military disapproves of certain private sexual conduct and, conse-
quently, prosecutes "Scarlet Letter" offenses.'
Kelly Flinn's story won over the civilian public. Many people
with little first-hand military experience felt the Air Force had no
right to interfere in members' "off-base, off-duty conduct," and, ac-
cordingly, the military must "get out of the bedroom."2A Moreover,
congressional leaders came to Flinn's defense. Senator Trent Lott
berated the Air Force for "picking on Flinn by enforcing... abusive,
outdated moral standards."' 5 Other representatives sent letters di-
rectly to the Secretary of the Air Force, urging her to call off Flinn's
court-martial.'
18. See id. A week after Flinn received the order to cease contact with Marc
Zigo, Flinn took Zigo home to Georgia for Christmas to meet her parents. See
id.
19. See id. at 33. The Air Force charged Lieutenant Flinn with the following
offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice: (1) failure to obey an or-
der; (2) making a false official statement; (3) conduct unbecoming an officer; (4)
fraternization; and (5) adultery. See Rives, supra note 15, at 6.
20. See Gibbs, supra note 11, at 32-33.
21. See Duffey Communications: Flying High?, PR NEWS, June 23, 1997, at 4.
22. See id. Flinn hired Duffey Communications, whose publicity tactic was to
portray Flinn's case as a "victimization by a system that has been called obsolete,
biased, and unjust." Id.
23. See 60 Minutes: The Court-Martial of Lt. Flinn; First Woman Bomber
Pilot on Trial for Adultery (CBS television broadcast, May 11, 1997).
24. Internight (NBC television broadcast, July 7, 1997) (discussing the Kelly
Flinn case and soliciting public views).
25. Flinn Case Polarizes Military, Civilians, FLA. TODAY, May 25, 1997, at
1A.
26. See Gibbs, supra note 11, at 33. Representative Nancy Johnson wrote to
the then Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall, that "[i]t is disgraceful that
Lieut. Flinn's career as a [bomber] pilot will be over simply because overzealous
prosecutors targeted her case over numerous others with more egregious circum-
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In response to growing public criticism, Air Force officials at-
tempted to explain that Flinn's court-martial was warranted by her
more serious offenses of lying and disobeying orders in relation to
the affair, and not the adultery itself.' Nonetheless, the criticism
continued. Opponents of the court-martial maintained that had the
military abandoned its adultery law, Flinn would never have felt
compelled to take such questionable actions to defend her privacy
and her career.' Facing continued public and political pressure, the
Secretary of the Air Force granted Lieutenant Flinn a general dis-
charge from the Air Force instead of proceeding to trial and continu-
ing the grueling public debate.' Although her military flying career
was finished, the general discharge allowed Flinn to escape a punitive
dismissal from the Air Force and a federal conviction for adultery.'
Notably, Kelly Flinn's case does not represent an isolated inci-
dent within the military justice system. In the past five years, the Air
Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have court-martialed 900 men
and women for charges that include adultery.31 In addition, the num-
bers of such prosecutions are growing within some branches of the
service.3 2 For instance, adultery-related prosecutions in the Air Force
grew from 36 in 1990 to 67 in 1996." Moreover, Kelly Flinn's pun-
stances." Id.
27. See id. at 31. The then Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald R. Fo-
gleman, told an investigating Senate committee, "[t]his is not an issue of adultery
.... This is an issue about an officer, entrusted to fly nuclear weapons, who lied.
That's what this is about." Id
28. See generally id. at 28-34 (describing Kelly Flinn's desperate attempts to
salvage her relationship with Marc Zigo and her pilot career).
29. See id at 33. Military regulations afford commissioned officers the op-
portunity to submit a request to their respective service secretary to resign "for
the good of the service" in lieu of proceeding to court-martial. See U.S. DEP'T OF
AIR FORCE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE INSTR. 36-3207, PERSONNEL:
SEPARATING COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, para. 2.23 (1 July 1995). Generally, if
the request is approved, the service secretary has the discretion to characterize
the military members' administrative discharge from the service as either (a) an
honorable discharge, (b) a general discharge (also known as a discharge under
honorable conditions), or (c) a discharge under other than honorable conditions.
See id. at para. 1.7, 2.23. Lieutenant Kelly Flinn first submitted a request to re-
sign but conditioned on receiving an honorable discharge; the Secretary of the
Air Force quickly denied Flinn's request. See Gibbs, supra note 11, at 33. How-
ever, the secretary did accept Flinn's subsequent request to resign conditioned on
a general discharge. See id.
30. See Gibbs, supra note 11, at 33.
31. See Rowan Scarborough, Challenge to Adultery Ban Unlikely, WASH.
TIMES, June 2, 1997, at A4.
32. See Vistica & Thomas, supra note 4, at 29.
33. See id. at 29. Importantly, however, military authorities rarely prosecute
adultery offenses independent of other, more serious, military crimes, such as the
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ishment was minor compared to that of other adulterous service
members. For example, in 1995 Air Force Captain Jerry Coles faced
charges nearly identical to those against Kelly Flinn. 4 However,
Coles's adultery prosecution did not receive similar public scrutiny. 5
As a result, his case did proceed to court-martial and his conviction
resulted in a five-month prison term and a punitive dismissal from
the service.36
The Kelly Flinn case propelled the issue of adultery into the
public eye, where it still remains under fire. For many, Kelly Flinn's
case shockingly revealed the military's ability to act as "pajama po-
lice," probing behind closed bedroom doors in an effort to regulate
the private sexual relationships of its service members. 7 Addition-
ally, many people do not comprehend how private extramarital af-
fairs can impact the military's ability to accomplish its mission of de-
fending our country. 8 Consequently, some feel that such intrusive
military laws need to be repealed or updated to accommodate the
sexual relations of a "modern gender-integrated military."39 For in-
stance, Representative Barney Frank proposed a bill in Congress that
would "decriminalize consensual sex in the military," including adul-
tery.40 He argues that such a change recognizes "the right of consent-
ing adults to have a private sexual relationship," free from govern-
ment intrusion.41
This statement reveals that regulating the sexual relations of
military members involves more than a mere policy decision; such
laws implicate constitutional guarantees of liberty and privacy. Must
false official statements and disobedience of orders in Flinn's case. See Rives,
supra note 15, at 4. For instance, since 1985 the Air Force has only prosecuted
nine individuals for adultery alone. See id.
34. See David Van Biema, The Rules of Engagement, TIME, June 2, 1997, at
36.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, June 16, 1997).
38. See, e.g., Dateline NBC (NBC television broadcast, June 13, 1997). The
statements of unidentified callers to this television news program demonstrate
the general public's view towards the military's adultery law: "I think it's ridicu-
lous that the military would punish people for something... to do with their per-
sonal life." Id. In addition, an informal poll taken by the news program revealed
that 62% of the American public felt that adultery should not be punished by the
military. See id.
39. Jean Heller, Does U.S. Military 'Get It' on Issues of Sex and Gender?, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 8, 1997, at 1A.
40. Rowan Scarborough, Gays Use Adultery Issue as Military Springboard,
WASH. TIMES, June 18, 1997, at Al.
41. Id.
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soldiers sleep in bedrooms with no curtains or covers in order to
serve their country, or do soldiers' private sexual activities fall un-
derneath a cover of constitutional protection that even the military
cannot pull back?
II. THE RIGHT To PRIVACY AND ADULTERY
The United States Supreme Court has never held there is a fun-
damental constitutional right to engage in adultery.42 Nevertheless,
this does not preclude such a right from existing today. The Supreme
Court has conferred constitutional protection on certain forms of
sexual and reproductive behavior in the name of "privacy."'43 Al-
though the right to privacy is not expressly listed within the text of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has held such a right exists in
the Constitution under the "penumbra" of the rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights" and as an implicit aspect of the substantive
"liberty" guaranteed in the Due Process Clause.45 Under this doc-
trine of substantive due process, the Supreme Court has protected
certain familial relationships and certain intimate decisions from un-
warranted government intrusion.4' In addition, when the Court
deems certain conduct or decisions fundamental under the Constitu-
tion, the government can infringe upon these rights only pursuant to
a "compelling state interest" and using laws or regulations that are
"narrowly drawn" so as to fulfill only that compelling interest at
stake.47
Although the Supreme Court has not provided a unified basis for
its privacy decisions, it has developed the right of privacy through
two distinct lines of cases.4 The first line of cases bases fundamental
privacy protection on the integrity and sanctity of marriage and fam-
ily, while the second line extends outside the family and bases the
42. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (stating "any claim that
these cases... stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct
between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is
unsupportable").
43. See United States v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174, 176 (C.M.A. 1992); see, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
45. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 684.
46. See id- at 684-85.
47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
48. See Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 736,740 (9th Cir. 1986).
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protection on broader principles of personal autonomy.49 An exami-
nation of the development of the Supreme Court's substantive due
process doctrine will inform the determination as to whether the
modem right of privacy extends to protect decisions and actions re-
garding adulterous sex.
A. Family-Based Privacy
Many of the Supreme Court's early substantive due process de-
cisions focused on preventing the government from intruding upon
the sanctity of certain family relationships.' For example, in Meyer v.
Nebraska51 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 2 the Supreme Court held
the liberty guaranteed in the Due Process Clause includes the right of
parents to guide the "upbringing and education" of their children
free from unwarranted government intervention. 3  In Pierce, the
Court struck down a state statute that required children to attend
public schools in lieu of available private and parochial schools.' The
Court reasoned that the state cannot "standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only" because
such compulsion infringes upon "the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol."' Therefore, these early decisions protected the integrity of the
parent-child relationship.
Similarly, the first modem substantive due process privacy case,
Griswold v. Connecticut,56 held that married couples have a constitu-
tional right to use contraceptives free from government interfer-
ence.' In Griswold, Justice Douglas based the right of privacy on
several textual guarantees in the Bill of Rights." He reasoned that
these rights have "penumbras"-related interests that must be pro-
tected to give the textual rights "life and substance."59 Specifically,
Douglas concluded that these "emanations" necessarily include a
married couple's intimate associations, derived from the First
49. See id.
50. See id. at 738.
51. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
52. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
53. See id. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
54. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530-31.
55. Id at 534-35.
56. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
57. See id at 485-86.
58. See id. at 483-86.
59. Id. at 484.
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Amendment's guarantee of free speech, and the physical sanctity of
the family home, derived from the Fourth Amendment's protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures." Hence, the idea of allow-
ing "the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives ... is repulsive to the no-
tions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."'"
After Griswold, the Supreme Court continued to protect the in-
tegrity of family under the right of privacy, but the Court abandoned
Douglas's penumbra basis in favor of more explicit substantive due
process approach. For instance, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,6
the Court extended constitutional privacy protection to include the
right of extended families to choose to live together. In this case, the
Court struck down an East Cleveland housing ordinance that limited
the occupancy of dwelling units to single "nuclear" families.6 The
Court stated "that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause." ' Furthermore, the Court reasoned that this protection was
not limited to nuclear families because the tradition of larger ex-
tended families "sharing a household.., has roots equally venerable
and equally deserving of constitutional recognition."'
Turning to the right at issue, this line of privacy cases does not
seemingly support a fundamental right to commit adultery. In these
cases, the Supreme Court based the constitutional protection on con-
cerns for the sanctity, values, and traditions underlying family rela-
tionships. Although the military's adultery law is similar to the con-
traceptive law in Griswold in that they both involve a government
invasion into the sanctity of one's bedroom, adultery involves no
familial aspect, which was a critical component in both Griswold and
Moore. Moreover, adulterous affairs are likely to destroy marriages
and erode family ties, the very interests these cases sought to protect.
B. Autonomy-Based Privacy
Notably, the Supreme Court did not base all of its early privacy
decisions on the sanctity of marital and familial relationships.66 In a
60. See id. at 483-85.
61. Id. at 485-86.
62. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
63. See iL at 504-06.
64. Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-
40 (1974)).
65. I& at 504.
66. See Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 736,739 (9th Cir. 1986).
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separate line of cases, the Court founded the privacy right on broader
principles of personal autonomy.67 Namely, the Court recognized
that substantive due process liberty encompassed the right to make
certain intimate decisions about one's life free from government in-
terference.6 This included choices regarding certain forms of sexual
or reproductive behavior.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird9 and Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional," the Court extended the right of privacy to the sexual lives of
single people and established their right to use contraceptives. In
Eisenstadt, the Court stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child., 71 In Carey, the Court added that "the constitutional protec-
tion of individual autonomy in matters of childbearing is not depend-
ent" on one's marital status or familial relationship.' Additionally,
the landmark abortion decision of Roe v. Wade73 also relied on the
principle of personal autonomy. In Roe, the Court held the right to
privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy."7 4 The Court reasoned that deny-
ing a woman the freedom to make this intimate decision, without
compelling justification, would arbitrarily invade her personal liberty
and natural right to control her own body.75
The principle of personal autonomy underlying this second line
of cases appears to support extending the right of privacy to include
consensual sexual activities, such as adultery. Although these early
cases only expressly extended this autonomy-based notion of privacy
to cover two situations, the use of contraceptives and the right to an
abortion, the regulation of adultery and other private sexual conduct
arguably implicates similar liberty interests. Namely, whom one de-
cides to have sexual relations with is an intimate decision about one's
life that, according to the reasoning underlying these cases, should be
67. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
68. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54.
69. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
70. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
71. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
72. Carey, 431 U.S. at 687.
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. Id. at 153.
75. See id.
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protected from unwarranted government intrusion.
Importantly, some lower courts have extended the right of pri-
vacy to cover adultery, based upon the Supreme Court's personal
autonomy line of reasoning.76 For instance, in Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, the Ninth Circuit held that individual interests in the pri-
vacy of adulterous sexual activities "are within the zone protected by
the [C]onstitution."78 In Thome, the El Segundo Police Department
forced a female applicant to disclose information about her sexual
relationships, including a prior affair with a married police officer; as
a result of her admitted adultery, the department denied her em-
ployment.79 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court's precedent
established two types of privacy interests: "One is the individual in-
terest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions."' Accordingly, the court concluded that the applicant had a
fundamental privacy right protecting her personal sexual associa-
tions, and, without compelling justification, the state could not re-
quire the applicant "to forego his or her constitutionally protected
rights simply to gain the benefits of state employment. 8' The court
further stated that "[t]his conclusion follows from the [Supreme
Court] cases holding that such basic matters as contraception, abor-
tion, marriage, and family life are protected by the [C]onstitution
from unwarranted government intrusion."' Notably, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari on Thorne and let the Ninth Circuit's decision
stand."
Consistent with Thorne, in Briggs v. North Muskegon Police De-
partment, a Michigan district court held the Supreme Court's auton-
omy-based privacy decisions established a general "constitutional
right of sexual privacy."' s In Briggs, a local police department fired a
married police officer due to his adulterous relationship with a mar-
ried woman not his wife.' In assessing the officer's substantive due
76. See Fugate, 791 F.2d at 740-41.
77. 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983).
78. Id. at 468.
79. See id. at 468-69.
80. Id. at 468 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599-600 (1977)).
81. Id. at 469.
82. Id. at 468.
83. See 469 U.S. 979 (1984).
84. 563 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mich. 1983), aff'd mem., 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir.
1984).
85. Id. at 590.
86. See id. at 586.
1083April 1998]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1073
process claim, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court's
protection of the intimate decisions and relationships underlying
marriage, procreation, contraception, and child rearing logically
formed a "constitutional right to privacy [that] extends to sexual con-
duct in intimate relationships between unmarried individuals," even
those relationships involving adultery.'
Specifically, the Briggs court reasoned that the Constitution's
privacy protection did not rest upon the marital status of the particu-
lar relationship because "[m]arriage exists to facilitate the expression
of emotional and sexual intimacy. That intimacy is so fundamental to
individual liberty that it demands constitutional protection. Nothing
is different about the psychological and emotional needs of unmar-
ried couples which would justify denying them the same protection." '
Accordingly, the court subjected the police department's action to
heightened scrutiny and concluded that "general community disap-
proval" cannot justify the "infringement of an important constitu-
tionally protected right."'89 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision.' Importantly, both Thorne and Briggs recognized
that the principled reasoning underlying the Supreme Court's per-
sonal autonomy line of privacy cases logically extends to protect cer-
tain forms of private consensual sexual behavior, including adultery.
C. Privacy Cases Converge
Despite these lower court holdings, the Supreme Court eventu-
ally stepped away from its autonomy-based substantive due process
decisions. In the 1986 case Bowers v. Hardwick,1 the Supreme Court
attempted to converge its two lines of privacy cases into a unified
theory and clarify the limits of privacy protection in the field of con-
sensual sexual activity. In a five to four decision, the Court held
there was no fundamental privacy right to engage in homosexual
sodomy.? Writing for the majority, Justice White undercut the
Court's prior autonomy-based privacy decisions by limiting those no-
tions of liberty to the specific contexts and relationships in which they
arose, namely "family, marriage, [and] procreation."" Accordingly,
87. Id. at 588.
88. Id. (quoting Note, Fornication, Cohabitation and the Constitution, 77
MICH. L. REv. 252,291 (1978)).
89. Id. at 590.
90. See 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984).
91. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
92. See id. at 192-94.
93. Id. at 191.
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the right to engage in homosexual sodomy bore no resemblance to
those announced rights.' Furthermore, Justice White boldly stated
that any notion that these previously declared rights "stand for the
proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consent-
ing adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is un-
supportable."' 5
Justice White explained: "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy" when it announces new fundamental
rights implicitly "imbedded in the Due Process Clause" and having
no explicit textual support in the Constitution.96 Accordingly, the
Court must employ exacting standards to "identify the nature of the
rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection" in order to
"assure itself and the public that announcing rights not readily iden-
tifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more than the impo-
sition of the Justices' own choice of values." 9' This entails recogniz-
ing as fundamental only those rights which are "'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [they] were sacrificed"'9 8 or those rights which are
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Under these
"tests," Justice White found no "fundamental right [for] homosexuals
to engage in acts of consensual sodomy."'0 Because the case did not
implicate a fundamental right, the Court held a state's moral disap-
proval for this conduct is a sufficient rational justification to pro-
scribe homosexual sodomy.101
The Supreme Court adhered to a restricted view of substantive
due process liberty in a subsequent plurality opinion, Michael H. v.
Gerald D.'02 In this case, a California law precluded the appellant
from gaining parental rights to his natural child, who was conceived
during an adulterous affair with the child's married mother.O3 The
California statute granted a presumption of paternity to the husband
94. See id
95. Id.
96. Id at 194.
97. Id at 191.
98. Id at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)
(alteration in original)).
99. Id at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)).
100. Id
101. See id. at 195-96.
102. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
103. See id. at 113.
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who was living with the mother at the time of conception." The
natural father challenged the constitutionality of the statute on a
number of grounds, including that the law violated his fundamental
substantive due process liberty interest in establishing a parental re-
lationship with his child."' The Court upheld the statute and reiter-
ated its view that "the Due Process Clause affords only those protec-
tions 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental."' 1"6
Justice Scalia, writing for the Michael H. plurality, distinguished
the Court's prior privacy cases protecting parent-child relationships,
stating that the protection was based on the institution of the
"unitary family" being "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.""' Justice Scalia concluded that the appellant failed to es-
tablish that his claimed special relationship, mere biological father-
hood, "has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic
practices of our society. ,", Therefore, the natural father's asserted
privacy interest did not receive heightened constitutional protec-
tion."
D. The Modem Right to Privacy
In Bowers and Michael H., the Supreme Court seemingly quashed a
potentially broad autonomy-based definition of privacy and, instead,
forwarded stringent standards for newly asserted privacy rights to re-
ceive constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause. How-
ever, the bare majority deciding these cases indicates that these deci-
sions stand on uncertain ground. Both cases deeply divided the
Court, most likely due to the implicit retraction of the Court's prior
autonomy-based privacy decisions. For example, in his dissent in
Bowers, Justice Blackmun berated the majority for ignoring the un-
derlying principle of personal autonomy recognized in prior privacy
cases.' In his view, the right asserted in this case did resemble, and
even closely paralleled, the rights deemed fundamental in previous
decisions."' Specifically, these cases all centered on one's "right to be
104. See id
105. See id. at 121.
106. Id at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
107. Id at 123-24.
108. Id. at 124.
109. See id.
110. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
111. See id at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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let alone" and the right of individuals to make "choices about the
most intimate aspects of their lives. ' ' 2
Blackmun criticized the majority's "obsessive focus on homo-
sexual activity ' and its comparison with the family relationships
protected in prior cases, while "'clos[ing] [their] eyes to the basic rea-
sons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded
shelter under the ... Due Process Clause."'" 4 Blackmun contends
"[w]e protect those rights.., because they form so central a part of
an individual's life"15 and the "moral fact that a person belongs to
himself and not others nor to society as a whole."'16 Blackmun fur-
ther argued that this right, to independently define one's identity, is
"'central to any concept of liberty"' and heavily depends on the
"'emotional enrichment from close ties with others,"1 .7 which in-
cludes "intimate sexual relationships.11 8 Hence, the principle of per-
sonal autonomy embodied in the Constitution and recognized in
many of the Court's past decisions supports a general fundamental
right of intimate association that would protect a person's choice to
engage in homosexual sodomy. 9 Using the majority's standard,
Blackmun concludes that such a right is fundamental because the un-
derlying value of individual liberty, not approval of the act of homo-
sexual sodomy itself, is "deeply rooted in our Nation's history."'0
Not only are the Bowers and Michael H. decisions weakened due
to their own contradictions with prior precedent, but also the Su-
preme Court has further undermined these cases in recent decisions.
For example, in the 1992 case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,' the Supreme Court rejected Justice Scalia's
strict substantive due process formalism in Michael H.m Specifically,
the Court expressly discarded the notion that an asserted privacy
112. Id. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113. Id at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494,501 (1977)).
115. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thomburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., con-
curring)).
117. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
118. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
122. See id. at 847-51.
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right must be "deeply rooted" in the nation's history in order to con-
stitute a fundamental liberty.ln The Court stated that "[n]either the
Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the
substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects."' 24 The Court further emphasized that it must exercise "reasoned
judgment" and not employ rigid standards to determine protected pri-
vacy interests because due process is an evolving "rational contin-
uum" and "not a series of isolated points. '' l' Therefore, "its content
cannot be determined by reference to any code."' '
Recalling its prior autonomy-based privacy decisions, the Casey
Court stated that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State."' Hence, the Court in Casey moved away from the lim-
ited substantive due process doctrine pronounced in both Bowers and
Michael H. and reaffirmed a broader, personal autonomy-based
definition of substantive due process liberty."z
123. See id. at 847-48.
124. Id at 848.
125. Id- at 848-49 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
126. Id. at 849-50 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
127. Id& at 851.
128. But see Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (The Supreme
Court's most recent substantive due process decision, holding the personal lib-
erty specially protected by the Due Process Clause does not include the right to
physician-assisted suicide for terminally-ill patients.). In making its decision, the
Court analyzed whether the asserted right was either "deeply rooted" in the na-
tion's history or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" in concluding such a
right did not deserve constitutional protection. See id. at 2268-70. Hence, the
Court's structured approach seemingly contradicts Casey's free-wheeling sub-
stantive due process analysis founded upon broader principles of personal
autonomy. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 848-51. However, in Glucksberg, the Court
referred to the teachings of history and tradition as merely "'guideposts for re-
sponsible decisionmaking,"' as opposed to strict requirements, in discerning fun-
damental rights. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (quoting Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). This approach is consistent with the"reasoned judgment" used by the Court in Casey. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
Furthermore, Glucksberg deals with a novel and unique issue under substantive
due process, not just one's personal autonomy in controlling decisions about
one's life but also one's right to solicit the help of others in ending that life. See
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2269. Therefore, Glucksberg does not hinder the gen-
eral direction of the Supreme Court concerning matters of pure personal privacy.
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Additionally, in the 1996 case Romer v. Evans,29 the Supreme
Court directly contradicted and, arguably, implicitly overruled its re-
strictive holding in Bowers. In Romer, the Court struck down, on
equal protection grounds, a Colorado constitutional amendment that
denied homosexuals special preferences and protections under state
or local law.' The Romer majority concluded that moral animus for
a particular class was an irrational and, hence, unconstitutional basis
for prohibiting local governments from providing anti-discrimination
protection for homosexuals 2
In his dissent, Justice Scalia objected to Romer's direct contra-
diction of Bowers: "[i]f it is constitutionally permissible for a State to
make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally per-
missible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosex-
ual conduct."'3 For example, Bowers held that a state could criminal-
ize homosexual sodomy based upon the rational justification that the
community considered this conduct immoral,' and, notably, "there
can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than
making the conduct that defines the class criminal."'35 Nevertheless,
Romer held moral disapproval was an irrational justification and
could not sustain even a seemingly less invidious form of discrimina-
tion, the mere prevention of special local protections for homosexu-
als.'36 Interestingly, the Romer majority opinion was completely de-
void of any reference to Bowers ."3
Hence, Romer's seemingly purposeful ignorance of Bowers sug-
gests its diminished, if not obsolete, doctrinal value in the eyes of the
current Supreme Court. Moreover, although Romer did not ex-
pressly overrule Bowers, many legal theorists claim that this was
Romer's precise implicit result and predict that the Court will make
such a ruling express when confronted with a future case factually
similar to Bowers."
129. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
130. See Thomas C. Grey, Gay Rights and the Courts: The Amendment 2
Controversy, 68 U. COLO. L. R!v. 373, 374 (1997).
131. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
132. See id. at 1629.
133. Id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
135. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97,103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
136. See id. at 1629.
137. See id. at 1623-29.
13& See Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia,
Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1267-68 (1997); see also Grey, su-
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In Casey, the Supreme Court, in evaluating the continued valid-
ity of its abortion decision in Roe, outlined a number of prudential
tests that the Court must consider before formally overturning past
precedent."' There are four major factors: (1) whether the doctrine
has proven unworkable; (2) the social reliance on the decision and re-
sultant inequity from overturning it; (3) whether the law has devel-
oped as to abandon the doctrine; and (4) "whether the facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification."' Using these factors,
Casey reaffirmed Roe because its doctrine remained workable and
respected, and, more importantly, "people have organized intimate
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves
and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abor-
tion. '
Unlike Roe, Bowers appears to be doomed under the Casey
standards. For instance, the Supreme Court itself demonstrated that
modern law has largely "abandoned" Bowers through its refusal to
even mention this pertinent case in Romer.4 Furthermore, Bowers
has not gathered any significant social reliance. The anti-sodomy
laws validated by Bowers that still exist today go largely unen-
forced.'43 Additionally, even the proponents of the Colorado amend-
ment in Romer ignored Bowers in their arguments and briefs before
the Court, further signaling the obsolete and unconvincing nature of
the decision.'" Hence, based on the doctrinal contradiction in Romer
and prudential standards of Casey, the Supreme Court appears will-
ing and is justified in formally overturning Bowers and its restrictive
view of substantive due process in a future case.45
pra note 130, at 385 (stating that "the Court's silence seems implicitly to deny the
premise-that Hardwick was still good law").
139. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55.
140. Id. at 855.
141. Id. at 856.
142. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620.
143. For instance, even Michael Hardwick himself never faced formal prose-
cution under Georgia's sodomy statute because Georgia law enforcement offi-
cials decided not to enforce the violated law. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197-98
(Powell, J., concurring).
144. See Grey, supra note 130, at 375.
145. See Larry Cata Backer, Reading Entrails: Romer, VMI and the Art of
Divining Equal Protection, 32 TULSA L.J. 361, 386-88 (1997). Only three of the
justices who took part in the Bowers five to four decision remain on the Supreme
Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor.
Rehnquist and O'Connor voted with the majority in Bowers and Stevens joined
the dissent. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187. In Romer, however, Justice O'Connor,
along with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, joined Justice Ken-
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Further marking the retreat from Bowers, Michael H., and a
limited view of substantive due process, lower courts are again ex-
tending the right of privacy to certain private consensual sexual ac-
tivities." For instance, in the 1997 case United States v. Bygrave,147
the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces conferred
fundamental status to the right of individuals to engage in consensual
heterosexual sex.'46 In Bygrave, a HIV positive serviceman claimed
his conviction of aggravated assault for engaging in consensual sex
with a female military member, who knew of his infection and whom
he later married, violated his constitutional right to privacy.149 Nota-
bly, the court discussed the uncertainty surrounding modem privacy
precedent, stating "the constitutional terrain, at least insofar as it has
been laid out by the Supreme Court, grows more difficult to negoti-
ate.""15 The court applied strict scrutiny to the military's intrusion
into the service member's sex life and, accordingly, implicitly con-
ceded that a fundamental right may be implicated.' Nonetheless,
the court concluded the intrusion was justified by the military's com-
pelling interest in preventing the spread of AIDS.'
E. A Constitutional Right to Engage in Adultery
The development of substantive due process and related equal
protection decisions indicates that the modem right of privacy in-
cludes a fundamental right of consenting adults to engage in adultery.
Specifically, choosing the person with whom to have sexual relations
is an intimate decision about one's life and is, therefore, a protected
aspect of substantive due process liberty. The Supreme Court's
autonomy-based privacy decisions, including Eisenstadt, Carey, Roe,
and Casey strongly support this asserted fundamental right. These
cases recognize that the liberty protected under the Due Process
Clause includes the freedom to make important personal decisions
and associations regarding one's sexual activities without government
nedy's majority opinion, which ignored and contradicted Bowers. See Romer,
116 S. Ct. 1623. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Justice
Scalia's dissent. See id. Hence, Romer indicates that six justices are potentially
willing to formally overturn Bowers in a future case, providing explicit height-
ened constitutional protection for private consensual sexual conduct.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Bygrave, 46 M.J. 491 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
147. Id
148. See id. at 495-96.
149. See id. at 494-95.
150. Id- at 495.
151. See id. at 495-96.
152 See id. at 496-97.
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interference. Furthermore, in Thorne and Briggs, lower courts held
this principled reasoning extends to establish fundamental privacy
protection for adulterous behavior.
Although Bowers and Michael H. purportedly limited the
Court's expanding view of substantive due process, the Supreme
Court has ignored, and even renounced, this restricted doctrine in
modem cases. Furthermore, recent lower court cases are again indi-
cating that the right of privacy protects additional aspects of private
consensual sex. Ultimately, the Supreme Court's precedent and its
current direction regarding substantive due process establishes a fun-
damental privacy right encompassing one's choice to commit adul-
tery. Hence, any law that "impinges upon [this] fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively
unconstitutional.""'
IV. THE RIGHT To CoMMIT ADULTERY IN THE MILITARY
A. The Unique Military Environment
Because of the unique nature of the military environment, con-
stitutional rights found in the civilian life may require a different
analysis when applied within the military." The military exists for
one important purpose: "to fight and win America's wars when
called upon to do so."'u Accordingly, the American people entrust
the military with the security of their nation and the lives of their
sons and daughters. 6 Thus, the military's critical role establishes it
as a society apart from the civilian world in two fundamental re-
spects. First, members of the armed forces have responsibility of the
153. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,76 (1980).
154. See Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997).
155. General Ronald R. Fogleman, The Bedrock of Integrity (visited Jan. 19,
1998) <http://www.af.mil/news/speech /current/The_Bedrock_of_Integrit.html>
(reprinting remarks that General Fogleman delivered at the United States Air
Force Academy Commandant's Leadership Series on Nov. 8, 1995); see also
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (stating that "[t]he differences between
the military and civilian communities result from the fact that 'it is the primary
business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occa-
sion arise"') (citing United States ex reL Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
156. See General Michael E. Ryan, The Air Force One Team, One Force, One
Family (visited Jan. 20, 1998) <http://www.af. ml/news/speech/current/The_
Air_Force_One_ TeamOne.htm> (reprinting General Ryan's remarks deliv-
ered during his swearing-in ceremony as the new Air Force Chief of Staff on Oct.
10, 1997).
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highest magnitude:" field commanders must order soldiers, airmen,
and sailors into harm's way to accomplish mission objectives;us mis-
sile-launch officers hold the keys that could initiate a nuclear war;
and pilots carry lethal weapons that, with one slip of the finger, could
annihilate scores of innocent civilians. No institution in the civilian
world is charged with such far-reaching and deadly power.
A second distinction involves military members' required level
of commitment to their employer. Notably, all members, whether
they currently sit behind a desk or command a tank division, have the
ultimate duty, when called upon, to sacrifice their lives to protect
their nation's security interests."9 If a military conflict arises, mem-
bers are subject to worldwide deployment without notice, can be
separated from their families for long periods of time, and may never
return."6 Most civilians will never be called upon to put service to
their employer ahead of their own personal lives and safety.
The unique military environment demands that soldiers be held
to higher and more rigorous standards of conduct."' Importantly, the
Supreme Court recognizes that the military is "by necessity, a special-
ized society," ' and military regulations "must insist upon a respect
for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life."'
Moreover, the military cannot apply its standards solely during times
of war because they are
as vital during peacetime as during war because [military]
personnel must be ready to provide an effective defense on
a moment's notice; the necessary habits of discipline and
unity must be developed in advance of trouble .... '[T]he
inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to
orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of imme-
diate compliance with military procedures and orders must
be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection."'
Thus, the military environment demands exacting standards of order
and discipline to ensure that the deadly power of the military is util-
157. See Grant Wade, No Punishment, No Responsibility, COM. APPEAL, June
1, 1997, at B7.
158. See id.
159. See Fogleman, supra note 155.
160. See Wade, supra note 157, at B7.
161. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 743.
162. 1&
163. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738,757 (1975).
164. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (quoting in part Chap-
pell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,300 (1983)).
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ized responsibly and to safeguard the lives of the many men and
women who subordinate themselves to protect their nation.
B. Constitutional Rights in the Military
Despite the rigorous demands of military life, courts have re-
peatedly held "one does not surrender his or her constitutional rights
upon entering the military."165 However, such rights "must be viewed
in light of the special circumstances and needs of the armed forces."' "
The Supreme Court recognizes that restrictions exist in the military
"'for reasons that have no counterpart in the civilian community"'
and such "'considerations must be weighed"' when considering the
constitutionality of military regulations.167 Therefore, constitutional
rights apply within the armed services, but the important demands of
military life can narrow their application."'
1. Impact on textual constitutional rights
To date courts have only narrowed the application of substantive
textual constitutional rights in a few areas within the military. For in-
stance, in Parker v. Levy,69 the Supreme Court limited the applica-
tion of the First Amendment in the military. In Parker, a military of-
ficer brought a free speech.challenge to his court-martial conviction
under the UCMJ for making several public statements urging en-
listed personnel to refuse to participate in the Vietnam conflict. 7
The Court reasoned that, although the First Amendment may protect
"disrespectful and contemptuous speech" in the civilian community,
it cannot be similarly enforced within the armed forces because such
speech undermines "'a command structure that at times must commit
men to combat, not only hazarding their lives but ultimately involv-
ing the security of the Nation itself.',
171
Similarly, the "special needs" of the armed forces have also lim-
ited the application of the Fourth Amendment in the military con-
text.1n In United States v. McCarthy,73 the United States Court of
165. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788,810(9th Cir. 1980).
166. Id; see also Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1426 (9th Cir. 1997) (referring
to Belier as standing for this proposition).
167. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758-59 (1974) (quoting United States v.
Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564,570,45 C.M.R. 338,344 (C.M.A. 1972)).
168. See id. at 743.
169. 417 U.S. 733.
170. See id. at 736.
171. Id. at 759 (quoting Priest, 21 C.M.A. at 570,45 C.M.R. at 344).
172. United States v. Taylor, 41 M.J. 168, 171 (C.M.A. 1994).
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Appeals for the Armed Forces held that a warrantless search and ap-
prehension of an airman in his barracks room did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. The accused claimed his barracks room was a
"'home' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment," and, there-
fore, was protected from unreasonable government intrusions.174 The
court rejected this argument, recognizing that "the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis of the appellant's apprehension must be [made] in the
context of a military setting."'75  The court reasoned that one's
"reasonable expectations of privacy within the military society will differ
from those in the civilian society" because in the military the reason-
ableness of intrusions "may be affected by the need for good order and
discipline."'76 The court concluded that one's barracks "does not pro-
vide the same sanctuary as ... a private home" and the accused "could
not reasonably expect to avoid apprehension... by retreating to his
room."
' 7
Different from military barracks and dorms, courts have not nar-
rowed the application of the Fourth Amendment to searches of the
on-base private individual quarters or off-base homes of service
members.'78 In United States v. Kaliski, the court overturned a con-
viction of an officer because the search of his on-base quarters vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment. In Kaliski, Air Force security police-
men stood on the officer's porch and peered through his curtains to
witness his sexual activities with another service member's wife."80
The Air Force used this evidence to court-martial the officer for
adultery, sodomy, and conduct unbecoming an officer.' The court
acknowledged that "[m]ilitary law recognizes a privacy right in gov-
ernment quarters" that does not deviate from the privacy afforded to
civilian homes." The court applied precedent from civilian Fourth
Amendment cases in finding that the officer had a "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" not only inside the walls of his quarters but also
in the property "immediately adjacent" to the home." Thus, the
173. 38 M.J. 398 (C.M.A. 1993).
174. McL at 402.
175. Id. at 401.
176. Id. at 402.
177. Id. at 403.
178. See United States v. Kaliski, 37 M.J. 105, 109-10 (C.M.R. 1993).
179. Id
180. See id. at 107.
181. See id at 106.
182. Id. at 108.
183. Id. (quoting United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296, 1300 (8th Cir.
1977)).
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court held the peeping cops' warrantless visual search was illegal.1"
2. Impact on non-textual substantive due process rights
Although courts have narrowed the breadth of the First and
Fourth Amendments within the military, no similar narrowing has
occurred with non-textual substantive due process rights.", In fact, in
numerous cases, both civilian and military courts have consistently
applied the Supreme Court's privacy decisions to military cases with-
out limitation.186 For instance, in Bygrave, the Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces analyzed the precedent of Griswold through Bow-
ers in attempting to determine whether military members have a fun-
damental privacy right to engage in consensual heterosexual sex."n
The court's reasoning indicated that substantive due process rights
pronounced by the Supreme Court are not narrowed due to military
considerations, but instead, when such a right exists, the military, like
any other state or federal institution, must advance a "compelling in-
terest" and take action that is "narrowly tailored" pursuant to that
interest in order to infringe upon that privacy right."
Similarly, in Belier v. Middendorf, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals faced the issue of military members' right to engage in ho-
mosexual sodomy before the Supreme Court's historic Bowers deci-
sion."8 9 As in Bygrave, the Belier court looked to the Supreme
Court's privacy precedent in its analysis and reasoned that some de-
cisions, such as Roe, arguably protected consensual homosexual con-
duct.1 O Notably, the court did not treat this right as any less funda-
mental due to the military environment and, as a result, applied strict
constitutional scrutiny to the military's challenged sodomy regula-
tion.91
184. See id.
185. See, e.g., Philips, 106 F.3d 1420; High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Hatheway v. Secretary of the
Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981); Belier, 632 F.2d 788; United States v. By-
grave, 46 M.J. 491 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v. Gates, 40 M.J. 354 (C.M.A.
1994); United States v. Henderson, 34 M.J. 174 (C.M.A. 1992); United States v.
Fagg, 34 M.J. 179 (C.M.A. 1992).
186. See, e.g., Philips, 106 F.3d 1420; High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d 563; Hatheway,
641 F.2d 1376; Belier, 632 F.2d 788; Bygrave, 46 M.J. 491; Gates, 40 M.J. 354;
Henderson, 34 M.J. 174; Fagg, 34 M.J. 179.
187. See Bygrave, 46 M.J. at 495-96.
188. Id. at 496.
189. See Belier, 632 F.2d at 807-12.
190. See id. at 810.
191. See id. at 810-12.
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Hence, in the area of substantive due process, a fundamental
privacy right to engage in adultery in the civilian context would be no
less fundamental in the military environment. Therefore, the mili-
tary's adultery regulation is presumptively unconstitutional and, as a
result, must meet strict scrutiny to survive a substantive due process
challenge.
C. Surviving Strict Scrutiny in the Military
Fundamental rights are not absolute and, therefore, untouchable
by the government.1" The government can intrude even on protected
privacy rights if it can identify a compelling interest and employ nar-
rowly tailored means to advance this relevant interest.193 Hence, the
military can intrude upon a soldier's constitutionally protected con-
sensual sexual activities to the extent necessary to accomplish com-
pelling needs of the armed services.
1. "Military" strict scrutiny
Before analyzing the military's justifications for infringing upon
military members' right to engage in adultery, one must realize that
courts apply a more deferential strict scrutiny analysis in cases involv-
ing military matters." The Supreme Court first utilized this concept
of "military" strict scrutiny in Korematsu v. United States,95 the infa-
mous World War II Japanese exclusion case. In Korematsu, the Su-
preme Court considered the constitutionality of a military order ex-
cluding all persons of Japanese ancestry, including American citizens,
from certain areas on the West Coast and subjecting those who re-
fused to leave to detention in relocation centers.196 For the first time
in its history, the Court pronounced that any law that curtails indi-
vidual rights solely on the basis of race or ethnicity is "immediately
suspect," and such a restriction must meet "the most rigid scrutiny"
in order to sustain its constitutionality.' 9 Nonetheless, the Court up-
held the military's discriminatory order."9 '
The Court unquestionably adhered to the judgment of military
192. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
193. See id.
194. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Rostker v. Gold-
berg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
195. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
196. See id. at 215-17.
197. Id. at 216.
198. See id. at 223-24.
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authorities that people of Japanese ancestry posed a special threat of
espionage and sabotage not similarly posed by other ethnic groups,
and, as a result, the Court found that the government had the requi-
site compelling need to justify the exclusion.1 Furthermore, the
Court concluded that the means employed by the military, a total
class exclusion, was necessary and not unconstitutionally overbroad,
even though the military had actual evidence of only a few disloyal
Japanese-Americans and ignored the option of conducting individual-
ized disloyalty hearings to exclude dangerous people on a case-by-
case basis.' Thus, although the Court purported to apply strict scru-
tiny to the challenged military order, it employed special deference
and respect for the judgment and reasoning of military leaders due to
the national security implications of the case.
Moreover, the Supreme Court applies this less demanding scru-
tiny even in military cases outside the context of war."' For example,
in Goldman v. Weinberger, a serviceman challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Air Force's dress and appearance regulations, claim-
ing they infringed upon his fundamental First Amendment right to
wear a yarmulke in respect of his religion.202 In reviewing the Air
Force's justification for preventing this religious exercise, the Court
reasoned that the critical and unique demands of military life require
that judicial scrutiny of military regulations be "far more deferential
than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for
civilian society. '" Moreover, the Court admitted that the judiciary is
"ill-equipped" to evaluate the impact that particular activities have
on military effectiveness, and, thus, "when evaluating whether mili-
tary needs justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated
conduct, courts must give great deference to the professional judg-
ment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a
particular military interest." ' Accordingly, the Court held the in-
199. See id.
200. See id. at 218-19, 223-34.
201. See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (upholding the constitutionality of an Air
Force regulation that prevented service members from wearing religious head-
gear); Rostker, 453 U.S. 57 (upholding the constitutionality of legislation that re-
quired the selective service registration of males but not females); Parker, 417
U.S. 733 (holding Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
are not unconstitutionally vague, stating that "Congress is permitted to legislate
both with greater breadth and with greater flexibility when proscribing the rules
by which [the military] will be governed." Id. at 756).
202- See id. at 504-05.
203. Id. at 507.
204. Id.
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fringement in this case was constitutionally justified because
[t]he considered professional judgment of the Air Force is
that the traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized
uniforms encourages the subordination of personal prefer-
ences and identities in favor of the overall group mission.
Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by tending
to eliminate outward individual distinctions except for those
of rank.'
Hence, these cases reveal that, in military cases, courts are more in-
clined to respect the government's legislative rationale as legitimate
and even compelling as compared to those cases unrelated to military
issues because "judicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative
action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies
and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged."' '
2. A compelling military interest
Even under a deferential strict scrutiny analysis, the military still
must establish that there is a compelling need to criminalize adultery.
Ultimately, the purpose of all military law, including those laws
regulating adultery, is to maintain "good order and discipline in the
armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the
United States." ° Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that "no
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the
Nation.""" Courts also recognize that "maintaining effective armed
forces is indisputably a compelling governmental purpose." How-
ever, under strict scrutiny, the military must affirmatively establish
that this is, in fact, the interest being pursued by its adultery law.
205. Id. at 508. Interestingly, after winning this case, the Department of De-
fense voluntarily authorized the military services to make reasonable accommo-
dations for the religious practices of military members. See U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, DiR. 1300.17, ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES WITHN
TiE MILITARY SERVICES (3 Feb. 1988). Subsequently, the Air Force authorized
the wearing of visible yarmulkes with the military uniform. See U.S. DEP'T OF
AIR FORCE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE INSTR. 36-2903, PERSONNEL:
DRESS AND PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL, table 2.8 (1
Apr. 1996).
206. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70.
207. MCM, supra note 1, pt. I, 3.
208. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,307 (1981).
209. Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Hatheway v.
Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating "[t]he gov-
ernment has a compelling interest in maintaining a strong military force").
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As brought to light by the Kelly Flinn case, many people fail to
see the causal connection between private adulterous behavior and
the effectiveness of a military unit;2 10 however, a critical link exists.
As already discussed, the military is a specialized and interdependent
society where the mission is critical and lives are always at risk. Due
to this unique environment, the military's strength and effectiveness
depends on trust: service members trusting one another and the
American public trusting the military as a whole.2" Therefore, the
military holds its members to high standards of moral integrity so
they, and the military as a whole, can be trusted.2 2
a. maintaining trust and confidence among soldiers
Most importantly, service members must be able to trust one an-
other. For instance, a pilot must trust her 19-year-old crew chief who
decides whether her aircraft is fit to fly; a paratrooper must trust the
17-year-old private who packs his parachute; and an infantryman
must trust his 30-year-old platoon leader who may ultimately decide
whether he lives or dies. 2  Moral integrity-knowing that a fellow
soldier always seeks and does what is right-provides the crucial
foundation for this trust.214 The former Air Force Chief of Staff,
General Robert R. Fogleman, once said, "[w]hen you ask young men
and women to go and die for their country, when you are put in a
situation where you make decisions that employ those people, it's es-
sential that they believe you are a person of honor and integrity who
has their best interests at heart., 215 Moreover, the General stressed
that trust is not built on words; behavior is the key:
[Y]ou must demonstrate the utmost integrity and honesty in
everything you do-on duty and off duty. You must be
straightforward in your dealings with superiors and subordi-
210. See Scarborough, supra note 31, at A4.
211. See Sheila E. Widnall, The Importance of Values (visited Jan. 20, 1998)
<http'//www.anil/news/speech/currentl/TheImportance.of_Value.html> (reprinting
remarks of the then Secretary of the Air Force, Sheila Widnall, at the 1997 com-
mencement ceremony at Texas A&M University at College Station, Texas on May 10,
1997); see also Parker, 417 U.S. at 758-59 (discussing the command responsibilities of
sending soldiers into combat); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 91 (1953)
(discussing the "special trust and confidence" of the President and the American
people placed in the hands of every military officer).
212. See Fogleman, supra note 155.
213. See Widnall, supra note 211.
214. See Fogleman, supra note 155.
215. General Ronald R. Fogleman, Leadership Initiatives (last modified Oct.
10, 1997) <http://www.af.millib/afissues/1997/issuepl.html>.
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nates alike. You must set the example of principled behav-
ior for all to observe, and you must do the right thing, even
when no one is looking. It is this example that inspires
troops to demonstrate similar integrity and self-sacrifice.
When they know your word is your bond, then confidence
and trust will permeate the outfit. On the other hand,
nothing destroys an outfit's effectiveness quicker than a lack
of integrity on the part of its leadership.2 6
Even outside the walls of the military, our courts recognize the
causal link between promoting behavior that fosters mutual trust and
achieving military effectiveness. More specifically, courts acknowl-
edge the deteriorating impact that certain private sexual conduct can
have on the military's compelling need to maintain a strong fighting
force.1 7 In Belier v. Middendorf, three Navy sailors challenged their
discharges for homosexual conduct on the grounds that such action
violated their privacy or liberty interests protected under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 8 Because this case pre-
ceded Bowers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals conceded that the
Supreme Court's then-existing privacy decisions could extend to pro-
tect "private consensual homosexual behavior."219 Nonetheless, the
court held the Navy's interest in the "effective and efficient perform-
ance of [its] mission" is sufficiently compelling to justify the regula-
tion of this protected sexual behavior. In making this decision, the
court accepted the Navy's rationale connecting this behavior to mis-
sion accomplishment, including "that a substantial number of naval
personnel have feelings regarding homosexuality, based upon moral
precepts recognized by many in our society as legitimate, which
would create tensions and hostilities, and that these feelings might
undermine the ability of a homosexual to command the respect nec-
essary to perform supervisory duties."22' The court found "[these]
concerns have a basis in fact and are not conjectural,"2 and, in up-
holding the regulation, concluded that "the importance of the gov-
ernment interests furthered ... outweigh[s] whatever heightened so-
licitude is appropriate for consensual private homosexual conduct."'
216. Fogleman, supra note 155.
217. See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810-12 (9th Cir. 1980).
218. See id. at 807.
219. Id. at 810.
220. Id. at 811 n.22.
221. Id. at 811-12.
222. Id. at 811.
223. Id. at 810. But see Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d
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Shortly after Belier, the Ninth Circuit decided Hatheway v. Secre-
tary of the Army,m an equal protection challenge to the Army's pro-
hibition of homosexual sodomy. Due to "the similarity of the inter-
ests at stake... [with those] in Belier," the court again subjected the
government action to heightened scrutiny. The court upheld the
regulation and reaffirmed Beller's reasoning that, due to widespread
moral disapproval, this form of sexual behavior undermines a service
member's "'ability to command the respect and trust of the personnel
he or she commands."' ' As a result, such acts "severely compromise
the government's ability to maintain... [a strong] force."'
The Ninth Circuit's decisions in Belier and Hatheway became
guideposts for every other circuit that subsequently faced constitu-
tional issues in regulating homosexual conduct in the military.' For
example, in Rich v. Secretary of the Anny,"9 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit heard a substantive due process
challenge to a soldier's homosexual discharge from the Army.= The
Court relied on the "nexus between homosexuality and unsuitabil-
ity"" for military service set forth in Beier and Hatheway in holding
"even if privacy interests [are] implicated in this case, they are out-
weighed by the Government's interest in preventing armed services
members from engaging in homosexual conduct."m Moreover, even
1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding service members cannot be discharged based upon
homosexual status alone). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the military's policy
for discharging homosexuals was rationally based upon the damaging effects of
homosexual conduct on the military; "the presence of persons who engage in
homosexual conduct, or who demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual
conduct by their statements, impairs the accomplishment of the military mis-
sion." l at 1472. However, in this case, the Navy's presumption that a mem-
ber's statement that "I am in fact gay" presents similar dangers by indicating an
intent or propensity to engage in homosexual conduct is irrational and
"arbitrarily goes beyond what the DOD's policy seeks to prevent." Id. at 1479-
80. The Court avoided this equal protection issue by construing the military's
regulation to mandate a discharge for a statement of homosexuality "only when
that statement itself indicates more than the inchoate 'desire' or 'propensity' that
inheres in status." Id. at 1479. The statement must demonstrate a "concrete, ex-
pressed desire to commit homosexual acts." Id.
224. 641 F.2d 1376 (1981).
225. Id. at 1382.
226. Id. (quoting Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 188, 811 (9th Cir. 1980)).
227. Id.
22& See Philips, 106 F.3d at 1427 n.12; see, e.g., Rich v. Secretary of the Army,
735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
229. 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
230. See id. at 1227.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1228.
1102
BEDS WITH SHEETS BUT NO COVERS
after the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers reduced the review of
such cases to mere rational basis, courts continued to refer to Belier
and Hatheway's heightened scrutiny rationale to justify the military's
infringement on homosexuals' asserted privacy interests. 3
Adultery presents a comparable threat to military effectiveness.
Similar to homosexual conduct, there is widespread moral disdain for
adulterous behavior. Consequently, adultery undermines a soldier's
"moral beacon" image that is vital to commanding the respect of
peers and subordinates in critical situations.' Indeed, military lead-
ers acknowledge that "it's tough to follow a moral maggot, especially
in combat."2' 5
Although modem Supreme Court decisions indicate that mere
moral repugnance towards a particular class or activity is an illegiti-
mate basis for government restrictions, 6 such considerations remain
legitimate within the military context due to the unique nature of the
military mission.2 7 For instance, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.,238 the Supreme Court struck down a city ordi-
nance that required special use permits for homes for the mentally
retarded but no other multiple resident housing because the city en-
acted the ordinance largely due to the negative attitudes and fears of
the surrounding property owners towards the mentally retarded.239
The Court reasoned that "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsub-
stantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning pro-
ceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the men-
tally retarded differently from" other multiple resident dwellings.2'
Nevertheless, Cleburne and similar Supreme Court decisions did
not involve military matters.21 As already discussed, courts evaluate
military regulations with "great deference to the professional judg-
ment of military authorities,"'  recognizing that "[i]n the armed
233. See Philips, 106 F.3d at 1425-26.
234. See Mark Thompson, Adulterated Standards: What's the Pentagon to Do
When Scandal Snags the Top Candidate for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?, TIME,
June 16, 1997, at 40.
235. Bill Menke, Hard to Tell Difference Between Parties, CN. Bus. COURIER,
June 20, 1997, at 51.
236. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432,448 (1985).
237. See Philips, 106 F.3d at 1427-29.
238. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
239. See id. at 448.
240. Id.
241. See Philips, 106 F.3d at 1429.
242. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
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forces some restrictions exist for reasons that have no counterpart in
the civilian community. "24 Accordingly, reasoning that has no ra-
tional place within a civilian context can, nevertheless, be legitimate
within a military environment.'" For example, the Supreme Court
acknowledges that "to accomplish its mission the military must foster
instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." 24'
Flaws in a soldier's moral character subvert this instructive process
and, therefore, put the mission and additional lives at risk.' Hence,
extensive moral disapproval for certain forms of personal conduct
remain legitimate and compelling concerns for the military.247
Apart from moral considerations, adultery entails an additional
harmful element not apparent in homosexual cases. Namely, an
adulterous affair "inevitably involves deceit,"2' and, most likely, de-
ceit of one's own spouse and children. States historically proscribed
adultery not only in respect of age-old biblical and moral norms, but,
more importantly, to protect "the marriage vow," the pledge of un-
yielding fidelity taken by each spouse.24' Contrary to this promise, an
extramarital affair destroys the bond of trust between a husband and
wife and "often rips apart families." m Hence, an adulterous service
member signals to the soldiers around him, "I am not to be trusted."
As a result, this promiscuous conduct directly undermines the inter-
relationships essential to the effectiveness of a military unit. 2 1 If a
member "cannot be trusted to control his or her emotions, libido or
temper, how then can he or she be trusted to command ships, fly nu-
clear-armed aircraft and send troops off to war?"
' 2
Kelly Flinn's case is a clear example of adultery's damaging im-
pact on military effectiveness. Flinn was entrusted to fly a nuclear-
armed bomber, and she had an affair with the husband of an airman
243. Parker, 417 U.S. at 758-59.
244. See id.
245. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
246. See Philips, 106 F.3d at 1427-29; Rich, 735 F.2d at 1228; Hatheway, 641
F.2d at 1382; Belier, 632 F.2d at 811-12.
247. See id.; Rich, 735 F.2d at 1228; Hatheway, 641 F.2d at 1382; Belier, 632
F.2d at 811-12.
248. Evan Thomas, Shifting Lines: After Cracking Down on an Adulterous
Female Pilot, the Brass Shields an Adulterous Male General, NEWSWEEK, June
16, 1997, at 32, 38 (quoting General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine
Corps).
249. See United States v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146, 147 (C.M.A. 1986).
250. City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464,470 (Tex. 1996).
251. See Menke, supra note 235, at 51.
252. Lou Ransom, Don't Compromise Standards, CIN. ENQUIRER, June 6,
1997, at A10.
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whose unit maintains safe operating conditions for her aircraft.23 In
the end, her adultery not only cast doubt on her ability to use sound
judgment when flying, but also, arguably, put hers and other pilots'
lives at increased risk.' This case of an officer stealing the spouse of
a subordinate enlisted member likely injected the entire enlisted
ranks with a general mistrust of all officers on base, and, as a result,
damaged a critical relationship between pilots and their support per-
sonnel.25 Indeed, one haphazard or careless oversight during an air-
craft safety-check can cost several lives and several million dollars.
Granted, these notions of trust and confidence are intangibles that,
for the most part, cannot be objectively measured. 6 Nonetheless, his-
tory and experience has taught our military that "circumstances that
foster trust and confidence must prevail" because they "engender dis-
cipline, which saves lives" and wins wars'
b. maintaining the trust and confidence of the American people
The military must not only foster trust and confidence among its
troops to maintain its effectiveness, it must also sustain the trust and
confidence of the American people. Ultimately, the American peo-
ple are the foundation of the armed forces' strength; they provide the
people and funds necessary to build a military infrastructure. 2s These
critical resources would become scarce if the public lost faith in the
military to which they entrust their security and the lives of their
family members. Thus, the military's high standards of moral con-
duct are a vital source of comfort and confidence for the American
public.2
9
Because the public entrusts the military with responsibilities of
the highest magnitude, Americans closely scrutinize the military, the
253. See Mark J. Chiarelo, Flinn's Affair Has Been Harmful for U.S. Security,
TIvEs UNION, June 1, 1997, at B4.
254. See id
255. See id
256. See Togo D. West, Jr., There's a Problem, and We Mean to Fix It (visited
Jan. 20, 1998) <http'//www.defenselink.mil/pubs/di97/di1207.html> (reprinting the
remarks of the Secretary of the Army, Togo West, before the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee on Feb. 4,1997).
257. Id
258. Id
259. See generally Debra Dickerson, Drawing the Right Line: Defense Secre-
tary William Cohen Knows It's the Mission That Matters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 16, 1997, at 35, 38 (stating that high moral standards are often "[w]ise
restraints" because "[s]oldiers often regard their service as a place where people
can use words like Duty, Honor, Country... without being ironic").
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decisions of its leaders, and the conduct of all its members. This
scrutiny reaches into military members' personal conduct and even
their sexual activities. One need only open a newspaper or magazine
to understand how sex can affect the public's perception of the mili-
tary. Most notably, the 1991 Navy Tailhook "sex scandal" shocked
the entire nation.m Numerous allegations of sexual misconduct, ranging
from sexual harassment to rape, arising from a Las Vegas convention
of naval aviators "branded the Navy ... as sexual harassers out of
control." 61 The official investigation of the incident implicated 117
Navy and Marine Corps officers for a wide range of sexual offenses,
including twenty-three indecent assaults and twenty-three indecent
exposures. 2 The most outrageous actions included "sexual relations
in public, paid consensual sex, oral sex, 'butt-biting,' and 'leg shaving'
in hotel rooms where women had their legs and crotches shaved by
aviators."' 3 This "atmosphere of debauchery" deeply scarred the pro-
fessional reputation of the Navy and the entire military.' Specifically,
Tailhook created a harmful public perception of a sexist military
willing to let soldiers "behave like animals when they are off duty or
'blowing off steam."' Does America want their sons and daughters
confined on ships with these people?
Importantly, the Navy's Tailhook debacle convinced the military
that it must take a tough and active role in quashing "disorderly, im-
proper, and promiscuous behavior."' Military leaders vowed to
"restore public trust and confidence" 267 in the military by creating a
professional environment that does not tolerate personal conduct
that "erodes the U.S. military's integrity and reputation for excel-
lence." m
Despite more concerted efforts to quash sexual misconduct, the
military's problems with sex scandals continue. More recently, na-
tional attention turned to the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground,
260. See Bill Gertz, 140 Implicated in Tailhook Report: Navy Leadership
'Breakdown' Cited, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1993, at Al.
261. Id. (quoting Representative Patricia Schroeder, a member of the House
Armed Services Committee).
262. See id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Kelso's Departure Gives Navy a Chance to Reinvent Itself, AuSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Feb. 18, 1994, at A20 [hereinafter Kelso's Departure].
266. Gertz, supra note 260, at Al.
267. Kelso's Departure, supra note 265, at A20.
268. Charles Grassley, Shape Up Military on Gender Issue, DES MOINES REG.,
Jan. 23, 1997, at 11.
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where a ring of Army drill sergeants allegedly extorted sex from fe-
male recruits during basic training. 9 The investigation also revealed
the commander of the training base, Major General Longhouser, en-
gaged in sexual impropriety, having an adulterous affair with a civil-
ian co-worker.270 Can America trust the Army to properly train and
protect their sons and daughters?
Finally, the most recent military sex scandal involved the high-
est-ranking noncommissioned officer in the Army, Sergeant Major
Gene McKinney. He is a married man and faced a court-martial for
several counts of sexual assault7 1 He was accused of seeking sex
from six women by using "varying degrees of pressure," sometimes
grabbing and touching them.m Although the military court acquitted
Sergeant McKinney of most of the charges due to a lack of concrete
evidence, the highly-publicized prosecution of this decorated military
leader, nonetheless, further undermined the professional reputation
of the military. 3 Can America have confidence in the judgment of
the top military officials who entrusted the Army's most prestigious
enlisted post to this man?
These cases of sexual impropriety erode the people's trust and
confidence in their military establishment. Although cases of adul-
tery can arguably be less egregious than the above examples, adulter-
ous behavior still involves the same issues of trust and fidelity. Adul-
terous service members serve their own interests above those of
others; they willingly subordinate the needs and trust of either their
own family or the family of their sexual partner. This creates the
same questions and doubt in the eyes of the American public. Can
we trust these people and the organization in which they act to al-
ways serve the best interest of our country and our children? The
trust and confidence of the American people is an essential source of
269. See Thomas, supra note 248, at 34.
270. See id.
271. See Paul Richter, Army Will Face Delicate Decision in Sex Case, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1997, at A4.
272. Id. The Army court-martialed Sergeant Major McKinney for eighteen
counts of sexual misconduct and one count of obstruction of justice. See Robert
L. Jackson & Dennis Freeman, McKinney Demoted, Reprimanded by Army,
L.A. TIMES, March 17, 1998, at Al.
273. See Robert L. Jackson & Dennis Freeman, McKinney Demoted, Repri-
manded by Army, LA TIMES, March 17, 1998, at Al. Ultimately, the military
court found McKinney not guilty of the eighteen counts of sexual misconduct but
did convict him of obstruction of justice. See id. The court sentenced Sergeant
Major McKinney to a reprimand and reduction in two ranks to master sergeant.
See id.
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strength for the military and, therefore, justifies the military in regu-
lating adulterous transgressions that undermine this special relation-
ship.
Thus, proscribing adultery serves the compelling purpose of
maintaining a strong and viable military capable of fighting for our
national security. The critical link is trust. First, adultery erodes the
trust among soldiers that is crucial in an environment where their
lives are on the line. Second, adultery undermines the trust and con-
fidence of the American public that is the ultimate source of military
strength.
3. A narrowly drawn regulation
The second prong of strict scrutiny requires that the military
only employ means "precisely tailored" to effectuate its compelling
interest of maintaining an effective military. Importantly, one need
only look to the adultery law itself to determine whether it is nar-
rowly drawn. For example, the military's criminal offense of adultery
requires three elements of proof:
(1) That the accused wrongfully had sexual intercourse with
a certain person;
(2) That, at the time, the accused or the other person was
married to someone else; and
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the ac-
cused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces 4
Noticeably, the law requires more than mere adulterous sexual
intercourse. The third element of the offense ensures that the rule is
implicated only when compelling military interests are threatened.
The government must show that the affair, under the circumstances,
either prejudiced the "good order and discipline" or brought
"discredit upon the armed forces. ' 'v 5 Hence, many private extramari-
tal affairs escape untouched by the military. Only when this conduct
threatens the compelling mission of the armed forces does the adul-
tery law require its application.
a. conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline
First, the adultery law applies to adulterous sex that threatens
274. MCM, supra note 1, pt. IV, 62.
275. Id.
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the good order and discipline of the military. Arguably, nearly every
instance of a military member acting improperly is prejudicial to the
military in some way, directly or remotely. 6 Nevertheless, the adul-
tery regulation, as applied by military courts, "does not include these
distant effects." m The military crime of adultery is limited to conduct
that causes prejudice that is "direct and palpable," 8 and the govern-
ment must present "specific proof of prejudice." 9
The case of United States v. Pereznm demonstrates that merely
proving that a military member engaged in adultery will not, by itself,
establish prejudice to good order and discipline.28 In Perez, an Army
staff sergeant appealed his court-martial conviction of adultery.m
The soldier had carried on an affair with a civilian woman, who was
not a co-worker, in the privacy of the civilian's off-base home.m The
sergeant was still married at the time of the affair, but he had entered
into a formal separation agreement with his wife.m The agreement
stated that each spouse "'could conduct individual business and per-
sonal affairs without interfering with each other in any way, just as if
[they] were not married."'' The court emphasized that a critical
element of an adultery offense is that "[t]he government must prove,
either by direct evidence or by inference, that the accused's conduct
was prejudicial to good order and discipline." 6 The court reasoned
that because the appellant was legally separated and the affair was
wholly private and did not involve a working relationship, the gov-
ernment failed to prove that the accused's conduct "adversely af-
fected good order and discipline." ' Accordingly, the court dismissed
the adultery conviction.
On the other hand, the case of United States v. Green 9 shows
that the government can prove the prejudicial element by establish-
276. See Captain Mayer, Satisfying All Elements of Adultery, ARMY LAw.,
Apr. 1992, at 38, 39.
277. IL
27& Id.
279. Major Hunter, Aids and Adultery, ARMY LAW., Apr. 1993, at 16, 18.
280. 33 M.J. 1050 (A.C.M.R. 1991).
281. See Mayer, supra note 275, at 39.
282. See Perez, 33 M.J. at 1054.
283. See id
284. See id. at 1052.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1054.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 1055.
289. 39 M.J. 606 (A.C.M.R. 1994).
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ing an adulterous affair's impact on the inter-workings of a military
unit. In Green, a married noncommissioned officer had sex with a
civilian in the enlisted barracks.2" The court concluded that this con-
duct did cause a "direct and obvious injury to good order and disci-
pline" because the accused was in a position of leadership and en-
gaged in these acts where other soldiers could see or find out about
them.291 As a result, this conduct would reduce other soldiers' trust
and confidence in the sergeant's integrity, leadership, and respect for
authority and regulations.2" The court upheld the adultery convic-
tion.'
b. conduct discrediting the armed forces
Even if the government cannot establish the adulterous conduct
is prejudicial to good order and discipline, an adultery offense can
still be predicated on a showing that the conduct "was of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed services." 24 Thus, an adulterous affair
that undermines the special trust and confidence of the American
people constitutes the military crime of adultery. Again, military law
requires more than a potential remote impact on the military's public
reputation.295 Military law requires the government to make an af-
firmative showing through "direct or circumstantial evidence or by
inference," that the affair "operated to bring the service into disre-
pute or lower it in public esteem." '
In Perez, the court also addressed the issue of whether the ac-
cused's adulterous conduct discredited the armed services. The
court indicated that the government must meet two elements in order to
establish service-discrediting conduct: (1) "[c]ivilans must be aware of
the behavior and the military status of the offender" and (2) "the
conduct offended local law or community standards." 298 The govern-
ment failed to offer any such evidence in Perez and, therefore, did
not establish the crime of adultery under the service-discrediting
prong.2'
290. See id at 608.
291. Id. at 610.
292 See id
293. See id.
294. MCM, supra note 1, pt. IV, 62.
295. See Mayer, supra note 275, at 39.
296. Hunter, supra note 278, at 17, 18.
297. See Perez, 33 M.J. at 1054-55.
29& Id. at 1054.
299. See id. at 1054-55.
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c. a narrowly drawn adultery law applied in the case of Kelly Flinn
In the case of Kelly Flinn, the Air Force's application of the mili-
tary's adultery standard plainly demonstrates that this law is narrowly
tailored to the compelling needs of military effectiveness. First, Kelly
Flinn's adulterous conduct directly threatened good order and dis-
cipline within the military. The military trains its enlisted members
to trust in the judgment of their superior officers and faithfully follow
their orders-even when it means putting their own lives on the line.
In return for this fidelity, the military expects its officers to lead and
make decisions with the best interests of their country and subordi-
nates in mind. At first, Kelly Flinn exercised the hospitality expected
of all military officers by helping an enlisted member new to the Air
Force and her civilian husband move into their new home. ° How-
ever, within a week of arriving at her new base, the young airman
found love letters from Kelly Flinn to her husband, revealing that this
seemingly trustworthy superior officer was having sex with and trying
to steal her husband?.' Unlike Perez, Kelly Flinn's affair was not
wholly private and unrelated to the inter-workings of a military unit;
she violated the trust of an enlisted corps trained to follow her or-
ders.m Thus, Kelly Flinn's adulterous conduct constituted a "direct
and palpable"'' injury to a military environment that relies upon
"instinctive obedience, unity, [and] commitment."'
Second, although Kelly Flinn's direct affront to military disci-
pline was sufficient to justify the application of the adultery regula-
tion, her conduct also undeniably discredited the professional repu-
tation of the armed forces. As the nation's first female bomber pilot,
Kelly Flinn assumed a position of great public honor and trustY0 5 She
flew an aircraft tasked with a nuclear mission, and, in a time of war,
her nation might call upon her to deliver nuclear weapons and other
payloads of mass destruction.3" As with other important military fig-
ures, Flinn's tremendous responsibility, coupled with her status as a
300. See Gibbs, supra note 11, at 32.
301. See id. Airman Zigo later wrote to the Secretary of the Air Force that she
felt helpless to stop the relationship between her husband and Kelly Flinn. See
id. at 30-31. Airman Zigo stated that "[Kelly Flinn] had power, both as an officer
and academy graduate. She also had special status as the first female B-52 pilot."
Id.
302. See id. at 30-33.
303. Mayer, supra note 275, at 39.
304. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
305. See Gibbs, supra note 11, at 30.
306. See id.
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female aviation pioneer, placed her life and even her private actions
under the watchful eye of the American public. Hence, even inde-
pendent of her intentional media campaign, Flinn's adultery would
have met the first required element for service-discrediting conduct,
that "[c]ivilans must be aware of the behavior and the military status
of the offender."'' Additionally, had Flinn's case proceeded to a
court-martial, the government could have also established the final
element for service-discrediting conduct, that "the conduct offended
local law or community standards." Kelly Flinn's adulterous affair
took place at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, where the local
law classifies adultery as a criminal offense.3 Thus, the Air Force's
prosecution of Kelly Flinn for adultery was a narrowly tailored means
to serve a compelling government interest because her conduct was
both prejudicial to "good order and discipline" and "of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.
310
The adultery regulation itself and the cases applying it dispel
public perceptions that the military can barge into service members'
bedrooms at any point and closely monitor their private sexual ac-
tivities. Instead, the military's adultery regulation is precisely tai-
lored to infringe upon this personal conduct only when its effects
travel outside the bedroom and impact the military's compelling in-
terest in maintaining a strong military establishment. Although the
right to commit adultery is deemed fundamental under a modem
substantive due process analysis, the military's adultery law survives
the requisite strict scrutiny because it both pursues compelling ends
and narrowly applies so as to substantially advance only those ends
deemed compelling.
V. CONCLUSION
To many, the Kelly Flinn case revealed the military's active en-
forcement of its adultery law and its intrusion into soldiers' private
sexual relationships. This is an intimate area of one's life that is, to-
day, protected as a fundamental aspect of substantive due process
liberty. Nevertheless, the military can continue to pull down the bed
covers of this privacy protection in order to enforce its adultery stan-
dard. Indeed, the military enforces its adultery law to advance the
compelling needs of maintaining a strong military force. In addition,
307. Perez, 33 M.J. at 1054.
308. Id-
309. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09 (1991).
310. MCM, supra note 1, pt. IV, 62.
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the adultery law is carefully tailored to avoid invading soldiers' pri-
vacy interests unless their conduct impacts these legitimate ends.
Hence, the sheets remaining on the military bed protect members'
private sexual activities from unjustified scrutiny so long as the ef-
fects of their private conduct never directly threaten military effec-
tiveness. Ultimately, the critical nature of the military's mission sus-
tains the constitutionality of its adultery law and demands that
military members continue to sleep in beds with sheets but no cov-
ers.3n
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